On 17th January, the Houthis conducted their first attack on Emirati soil in years. Carried out in the heart of the country– Abu Dhabi –with the help of a UAV, the attack killed three foreign nationals working in the city– two Indians and one Pakistani. In the aftermath of the attack, the Arab Coalition intensified the air bombings of key strongholds of the Houthis, leading to an increase in civilian casualties in a proxy war that has already caused several thousand civilians their lives. The attack has also underlined the capabilities of the Islamist political outfit in striking a distant country, and not just its northern neighbour. The attack has also rendered the UAE as a country susceptible to attacks from hostile groups in the region.
Costs of UAE’s intervention strategy
Importantly, the attack has led to a scrutiny of UAE’s policy vis-à-vis the hapless South Arabian country. Not long ago, in February 2020, the Emirati leadership, in an official ceremony addressing the recent returnee personnel deployed in Yemen, added an achievement to its touted ‘Peace First’ strategy in the country[1]. The gulf country had begun its troop withdrawal from the war-torn country in July of 2019[2]. This move, though remarkable, was hardly surprising by a country that was stopped in its tracks after finding itself as a part of the Arab Coalition[3] back in 2015. But the withdrawal of troops from Yemeni soil didn’t mean a dilution of its involvement in the Civil War. The move by the Emirates was seen as merely a shift from direct involvement to an indirect one.[4] The leadership of the country had utilized its presence in Yemen to cultivate and build a network of belligerents of the Civil War, such as the Sothern Transitional Council (STC), Security Belt Forces and the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite forces to name a few.[5] A withdrawn and non-aggressive UAE depends heavily both upon and sponsors such groups to keep its influence in the country afloat. It had reportedly trained some 90,000 South Yemenis during its stint in the country.[6] These militias have fought, in the past, against the Houthis, Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Islah and the ISIS. In December last year, one such group, the Giants Brigades, attacked Houthis, eventually defeating them in the Shabwah province. The Houthi attack in January is seen as a retaliation for this precise attack.
In December last year, one such group, the Giants Brigades, attacked Houthis, eventually defeating them in the Shabwah province. The Houthi attack in January is seen as a retaliation for this precise attack.
Another key takeaway from the attack on 17th January is associated with the Saudi Arabia-UAE partnership. The Emirates, which contributed the second-largest troops to the Arab Coalition, had virtually abandoned Saudi Arabia in its effort to bring the Hadi government back to Sana’a. Since 2016 up to the troops’ pull-out, the country had focused mainly on counter-terrorism operations, primarily targeting Islah.[7] The two partners were pitted against each other when, in 2019, the Emirati-backed STC pushed itself into the provinces of Shabwa and Abyan held by the Saudi-backed government. Now, with the Houthis becoming a potent threat to the security of the UAE, the stress between the two governments is set to cool down. The attack has made UAE substantially, if not equally vulnerable, when compared with Saudis, to Houthis’ aggression. But it is not likely that the country will put an end to its troop withdrawal strategy. Its focus is likely to be on strengthening its security apparatus, something already visible in French, American and Israeli assistance.
Attacks boost UAE-Israel Strategic Partnership
The Houthis conducted another failed attack on Abu Dhabi in late January during Israeli President Herzog’s visit. The day was chosen to deliver a message to both Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem. This, and other numerous attempts by the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia militia to attack the Emirates, is set to further firm up the already burgeoning ties between the two. Immediately after the January 17th attack, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett offered Israeli ‘security and intelligence support’ to the victim state[8]. He committed to partner with the UAE to defeat ‘common enemies’. Right after the signing of the Abraham Accords, both the countries embarked upon strengthening security-related ties[9], leading to the signing of a strategic agreement to develop unmanned military and commercial vessels in November last year. Both the countries have been susceptible to attacks by Iran’s proxies. It is Israel’s North-eastern neighbour Syria that has posed a threat to its security. Now, Houthis’ reach to the Emirati soil renders Israel vulnerable to similar attacks, with speculations already in works in Israel.[10] Additionally, Houthis’ ties with Lebanese Hezbollah could aggravate the situation further. Israeli-Emirati partnership seems to be the greatest benefactor of the attack.
the UAE has been applauded for pursuing a balanced approach between Saudi Arabia and the US on one hand and Iran and its allies on the other[13]. But with the continuous attack on Abu Dhabi by Iranian proxies, the relations between the UAE and Iran are set to face road blocks
Just as Emirates was coping with the deadly attack from Yemen, another Iraq-based armed group conducted a drone strike on Abu Dhabi. Known by the name Awliyat al-Waad al-Haq, or the True Promise Brigades, the Shia Islamist group is widely believed to have close ties with both Tehran and Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah. Though the Iranians have not publicly supported the attacks, they haven’t condemned them either. Moreover, the attacks on Abu Dhabi came just months after Emirati National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Tehran where he touted his visit as a ‘turning point’ for the two countries[11] and visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani to Abu Dhabi, declaring that the two countries had agreed to open ‘a new chapter’ in their bilateral relations[12]. Also, the UAE has been applauded for pursuing a balanced approach between Saudi Arabia and the US on one hand and Iran and its allies on the other[13]. But with the continuous attack on Abu Dhabi by Iranian proxies, the relations between the UAE and Iran are set to face road blocks.
Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis
Last year, in one of his first decisions regarding West Asia, President Biden revoked the Trump administration decision to recognize Houthis as a foreign terrorist group. After the recent attacks on Abu Dhabi and the al-Dhafra airbase, the Biden administration has been forced to reconsider its previous decision[14]. The US has, in response to the attacks, stepped up its naval deployment in the Gulf region, along with enhancing cooperation in intelligence and air defence with the Emirates. It also helped stave off other Houthi missile attacks on Abu Dhabi through US Patriot interceptors. The attacks also come at a crucial time when the talks between P5+1 and Iran regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal underway in Vienna. With eight rounds that have passed without any breakthrough, it remains to be seen how Houthi aggression impacts the JCPOA.
The Civil War in Yemen is in its eighth year, with no signs of the end in near future. The casualties have reached as high as 377,000. It has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, pushing millions to the brink. According to a UNDP report, the war may cause more than 1.3 million casualties by 2030. Hence, we need to ask, has the international community failed to protect the Yemeni people?
Notes
[1] Jalal, I (2020, February 25), ‘The UAE may have withdrawn from Yemen, but it’s influence remains strong’ Middle East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong
[2] Ibid
[3] Salisbury, P. (2020, July 1), ‘Risk perception and appetite in UAE Foreign and national security policy’ Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/8-case-study-uae
[4] Jalal, I (2020, February 25), ‘The UAE may have withdrawn from even, but it’s influence remains strong’ Middle East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] Salisbury, P. (2020, July 1), ‘Risk perception and appetite in UAE Foreign and national security policy’ Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/8-case-study-uae
[8] TOI staff, (2022, January 18),’Bennett offers UAE security and intelligence support after attack by Houthis’ Times of Israelhttps://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-offers-uae-security-and-intelligence-support-after-attack-by-houthis/
[9] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2021, August 6), ‘Restoring balance to UAE-Iran relations’ Doha Institute https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Restoring-Balance-to-UAE-Iran-Relations.aspx
[10] Melman, Y. (2022, January 21),’After Abu Dhabi, is Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat next target for Houthi drone strike’ Haaretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-red-sea-eilat-target-houthi-iran-drone-strike-abu-dhabi-1.10553018
[11] Hafezi, H. (2021, December 6), ‘UAE security official pays rare visit to Iran to discuss ties, regional issues’ Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-emirates-idAFKBN2IL0ME
[12] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2021, August 6), ‘Restoring balance to UAE-Iran relations’ Doha Institutehttps://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Restoring-Balance-to-UAE-Iran-Relations.aspx
[13] Ibid
[14] Landay, J (2022, January 20). ‘Biden says administration mulling re-designating Yemen’s Houthis a terrorist group’, Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-yemen-envoy-lenderking-visit-gulf-london-state-department-2022-01-19/
Feature Image Credit: www.mirror.co.uk
Image Credit: itv Times News
