On 21 November 2023, India’s Ministry of External Affairs advised Indian citizens to avoid nonessential travel to Myanmar, given the evolving security situation in that country. It further advised that those already living in Myanmar should take precautions and avoid travel to regions affected by violence[i]. Earlier in the same month, UN Secretary-General António Guterres had expressed deep concern at the expansion of conflict in Myanmar[ii] . Both messages highlight the increasingly fragile situation in Myanmar, where two million people are displaced and over 286,000 similarly affected after the current upsurge in fighting[iii].
Operation 1027 and its Implications
The map published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies lists the number and type of violent events countrywide until July 2023. Since then, there has been a spike in the level of violence. Most prominent has been the coordinated attack on 27 October on Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) posts in the Northern portion of Myanmar’s Shan state (see map), near the Chinese border by three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), assisted by other Peoples’ Defence Militias (PDFs). As per Richard Horsey of the International Crisis Group[i], the attacks, dubbed ‘Operation 1027’ (after the date they commenced), involved several thousand experienced, well-armed fighters attacking multiple army posts simultaneously. These troops owed allegiance to three major EAOs – the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army ( AA), comprising different ethnicities ( Kokang, Ta’ang and Arakanese, respectively). Of the three, the first two are based in Shan state in the East, while the AA, as the name denotes, is based in Rakhine on Myanmar’s West coast, bordering some portion of the Chittagong Division of Bangladesh. Within two weeks, these three armies dubbed the Three Brotherhood Alliance, had seized several towns along the Chinese border, overrun military bases and captured large stocks of munitions. Specifically, to quote the Asia Times…the key border posts of Chin Swe Haw and Mong Ko were seized along with 80 military and police bases. More than 120 military bases have since been overrun, and sizeable amounts of arms and ammunition seized, including reportedly several 14.5 heavy machine guns (HMGs)…‘[ii]. ISP Myanmar, a Myanmarese think tank based in Thailand, notes that resupply columns are being ambushed on the main artery from Mandalay, around the area of Kyaukme, as shown on the map below[iii].
Operation 1027 has created significant disruptions in the Myanmar-China border trade. The current offensive aims to eradicate online gambling and scam call operations from various casinos in the northern portion of Shan and Kayin states bordering China and Thailand, an objective shared by the Myanmar Government, which is under pressure from China on this matter. Nationals from these countries, along with Chinese criminals, have been identified for their involvement in such illegal activity in concert with local pro-government militias. The rebels’ aim could likely be to gain China’s favour and wrest territory from Tatmadaw’s control[i]. To avoid the bloodshed, many Myanmar nationals are attempting to cross into China. China, whose proposed projects under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) run through these regions in Northern Shan state, has since called for a ceasefire on this border[ii]. Noteworthy for military analysts, however, is the well-coordinated planning and execution displayed in these successful attacks, demonstrating the growing strength and assertiveness of the EAOs and PDFs operating over large swathes of territory.
In concert with Operation 1027, EAOs have been equally active in other parts of Myanmar. The Sagaing region North of Mandalay bordering Manipur and Nagaland is witnessing fresh fighting[iii]. A Myanmar Army spokesman is quoted as having admitted that troops were under “heavy assaults from a significant number of armed rebel soldiers” in Shan state in the North, Kayah state in the East and Rakhine state in the West[iv]. In Rakhine, a year-long ceasefire between the Arakan Army and Tatmadaw collapsed, and fighting recommenced. In Kayah state bordering Thailand, a video clip (verified by Reuters) shows wounded Tatmadaw soldiers surrendering to the rebels who offer medical treatment to them. Fighting rages around the state capital, Loikaw, from which the UN has evacuated its personnel[v]. Heavy fighting has taken place in Chin state. The Junta has declared martial law in certain towns in Shan, Chin and Kayah states and Sagaing region.
Members of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army pose for a photograph in front of the seized army’s infantry battalion in Kunlong township in Shan state, Myanmar, on 12 November. (AP). Courtesy: Rezaul H Laskar, Hindustan Times 15 November 2023.
India’s Concerns
With the Sagaing region bordering Nagaland and Manipur and Chin state bordering Manipur and Mizoram, the upsurge in violence has become a pressing concern for India, which is already grappling with the crisis in Manipur that has a linkage with Myanmar. In the current crisis in mid-November, Chin rebels overran two Tatmadaw posts on the India-Myanmar border in villages close to the Myanmar border township of Rikhawdar. This is adjacent to India’s Land Customs Station (LCS) at Zokhawthar. The Tiau River forms the boundary crossed by a Bailey bridge (picture below).
Picture: Courtesy Reuters
A fresh flow of refugees (estimates from four to five thousand) has now crossed over to the Indian side to escape the fighting as the Tatmadaw attempts to retake these posts. This influx is in addition to those who crossed over earlier during the coup in February 2021. The capitulation of the Tatmadaw in these bases has also resulted in a unique situation; 74 Myanmar soldiers fled to India with their weapons and surrendered to the Indian authorities, who, at the request of the Myanmar Government, facilitated their return[i].
All the above issues highlight the highly volatile climate in Myanmar, necessitating the Indian government’s advisory. Sufficient reportage exists to show that the rebel forces under the National Unity Government (NUG) are steadily gaining ground; Gen Min Aung Hlaing, Chairman of the State Administrative Council (SAC) and de facto head of state conceded early this year that only 198 of the 330 townships are “100 per cent stable,” while the remainder required “security attention.”[ii] This is close to fifty per cent of the country. Clearly, the civil war is entering a more intense phase.
State of the NUG
The dynamism of the NUG can be gauged by its creative methods to raise revenues to support its war aims. Some of these mechanisms, based essentially on the buyers’ ( including the diaspora’s) good faith, are zero-interest bonds, real estate auctions of land (including government land taken from civilians – a lakeside villa appropriated by Gen Hlaing was auctioned some time ago), proposed condominiums for later construction, auctioning of mining rights and leases, lotteries, donations and tax collection. It provides primary education, health, justice and law and order in areas under its control. It has launched a digital currency that is run through the open-source blockchain Stellar network73, used through its digital wallet app, NUGPay. It uses commercial quadcopter drones for logistics, has commenced weapons production to include 60mm and 90mm mortars, and is experimenting with 3D printing[iii].
The NUG’s success in creating such an infrastructure despite the SAC’s depredations and the victories of its forces on the ground over the last two years is testimony to the support it enjoys among the ordinary people, bolstered by sophisticated information operations. The latter includes a Policy Paper of 2021[iv], which enunciates NUG’s efforts to become more inclusive. A beginning has been made by appointing a Rohingya, Aung Kyaw Moe, to a ministerial post. His appointment as the NUG’s Deputy Human Rights Minister is a signal to others, including the UN whose Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, stated this year that ..’ Min Aung Hlaing, who led the genocidal campaign, is now at the head of an illegal and illegitimate military junta that is attacking civilian populations throughout Myanmar. He must be brought to justice and made to answer his crimes…‘[v]. The NUG Policy Paper promises to bring perpetrators of crimes against Rohingyas to justice and grant citizenship rights to all based on parentage or birth in Myanmar. It also speaks of developing a comprehensive repatriation plan for Rohingyas who have fled Myanmar. Resolving this issue will remove a significant obstacle in ties with Bangladesh, which shelters over one million Rohingyas while looking to curb activities of militant organisations like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The ARSA operates from both sides of the border, using tunnels to move cadres to and fro and has frequently resorted to terrorism.
Crystal Gazing
What, then does the future hold for the SAC? The regime is facing multiple sanctions from the West. Citing ongoing violence, it had earlier announced the postponement of elections planned for August 2023 and continues with the state of emergency. It, however, seeks to exploit its geography as an Indian Ocean littoral and land bridge between South and South East Asia to gain strategic advantage. Trade with Russia has increased, and MOUs on cooperation in various infrastructure projects, including nuclear and natural energy, have been signed. Though the CMEC is now moving at a snail’s pace with many impediments and under constant security threats, none of its projects have been cancelled[vi] as has happened elsewhere. Russia and China are also the leading suppliers of advanced weapon systems to Myanmar. Military cooperation has been extended to naval exercises; this month, Myanmar held a three-day maritime security exercise’ with the Russian Navy from 06 November in the Andaman Sea for the first time. Again, on 28 November, two Chinese warships and a resupply vessel have docked in Yangon on a ‘goodwill visit’ to be followed up with exercises. Despite such signalling, there is no guarantee how much support these two countries would provide in an increasingly uncertain climate.
India’s policy has been one of non-interference in Myanmar’s affairs. It has been feeling its way through the deepening crisis in that country that originated with the coup over two years ago. Government-to-government cooperation continues, with visits by senior Indian dignitaries on essential occasions. Though India does not support the NUG, looking beyond and planning for multiple outcomes is prudent.
India’s priority is to have peace on the border with Myanmar. Instability here has directly impacted the internal security and societal dynamics of at least two border states. For securing the border, an advanced intelligent fencing system of 100 km along the border ‘is in the pipeline’ while a little over 6 Km has been physically fenced around the border township of Moreh in Manipur[vii]. Fencing the entire 1643 km long border is unlikely to find favour for multiple reasons – costs, physical difficulty, and social and political implications, especially when ethnic kin live on both sides with a Free Movement Regime (FMR) in place that permits movement up to 16 Km inside.
The other way of securing the border will be through cooperation between the three affected parties – India, the SAC and insurgent groups operating in the vicinity. It is here that India’s leverages can come into play – the goodwill built up with local communities by sheltering and providing succour to those who have come across, and non-interference with activities of the Tatmadaw, including assisting as in the case of the fleeing soldiers. Considering that peace on the border will benefit all three parties, communication at the local level with the insurgents through intermediaries and parallel government-to-government interaction can ensure that guarantees for the same are obtained. This can be combined with rehabilitation projects for those displaced, with Indian assistance.
Looking beyond the immediate, the difficulty in providing any prognosis for Myanmar should not obscure the fact that it remains among India’s most important neighbours and a vital cog of our Act East policy. With peace prevailing, its role in the development of our North East will only increase, as an overall assessment of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project’s potential shows. A stable, peaceful and multi-ethnic Myanmar will always remain a priority for India. In the interim, the need is to contemplate multiple outcomes and plan for eventualities, favourable or otherwise.
Notes
[i] ‘29 Myanmarese soldiers repatriated from Mizoram amid border tension’ Statesman News Service Aizawl 20 November 2023.
[ii] ‘Sustaining Funding for Myanmar’s Spring Revolution’ Stimson Policy Paper Zachary Abuza May 17, 2023
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] ‘ Policy Position on the Rohingya in Rakhine State’ Republic of the Union of Myanmar National Unity Government June 03 2021.
[v] ‘UN expert demands accountability for the Rohingya and an end to ‘paralysis of indifference’’ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, press release 24 August 2023.
[vi] ‘The Dwindling Prospects For Russian and Chinese-Backed Infrastructure Projects in Myanmar’ Syah Vaghji
The Diplomat November 09, 2023
[vii] Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Report 2022-23 Chapter 3 Border Management para 3.21
Feature Image: Brotherhood Alliance fighters are seen at the entrance of a regime Army base in Kunlong on Nov 12, 2023/MNDAA – www.irrawaddy.com
1 comment
Alok, a well researched & well articulated piece. Wishing more ink to your pen. Keep up the good work! ——// Besides, another issue that should worry India is the rising drug menace & the ongoing internal ethnic strife in Manipur. May be India needs to be vigilant & act actively!