The latest round of fighting between Israel and Palestinians within Israel and the Gaza Strip ended on Friday 21 May under an Egypt brokered ceasefire. Already categorised in the media as the Fourth Gaza War[1], the 11-day conflict left 232 Palestinians including 65 children killed and more than 1,900 wounded in aerial bombardments[2]. Israeli authorities put their death toll as 12, with hundreds injured due to rocket attacks while claiming to have killed at least 160 combatants[3]. One Indian civilian caregiver too lost her life in the line of duty.
Patrick Kingsley’s piece in the New York Times provides a view of a series of events from early April that led to the current conflict[4]. Several avoidable actions in Jerusalem, such as cutting off loudspeakers at the Al Aqsa mosque on the first day of Ramadan to prevent Jerusalem Day celebrations at the Western Wall from being disturbed, closing off a popular plaza at the Damascus Gate where the faithful gather after prayers leading to nightly protests, and orders for the evacuation of Palestinian families from their homes as per existing law (an act seen by Palestinians as a precursor to their removal from East Jerusalem, the proposed capital of an independent Palestine) followed by clashes between Jews and Arabs – together provided multiple triggers for the violence, aggravated further by Jewish right-wing groups marching through Jerusalem shouting provocative slogans.
As the demonstrations gathered momentum with more Palestinians rallying in support of the families facing eviction, the order was stayed by Israel’s Supreme Court. The cancellation of elections to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) by President Mahmoud Abbas added another element of uncertainty to the situation, fuelled by suspicion over his intent. The final straw was another police raid on the Al Aqsa Mosque on the last Friday of Ramadan and sealing off access to the mosque the next day. Sensing a cue, Hamas commenced rocket fire the following Monday from Gaza.
International Crisis Group opines that ‘this occasion is the first since the September 2000 intifada when Palestinians have responded simultaneously and on such a massive scale throughout much of the combined territory of Israel-Palestine to the cumulative impact of military occupation, repression, dispossession and systemic discrimination[5]. It further goes on to explain how the dynamic of this conflict differs from earlier ones. Central to this is the role of Hamas – in terms of military capability through an expanded long-range rocket arsenal which has exponentially enhanced its ability to terrorize Israel’s civilian population, as also its political ambitions in trying to negotiate the future of Jerusalem as leverage for subsequent resolution of the Palestinian issue, instead of confining itself to Gaza. Tellingly, it also named its rocket offensive ‘Sword of Jerusalem’.
The second noteworthy issue is about clashes in cities and townships across Israel and the West Bank, between Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians leading to loss of life and property, something that had never happened since the Second Intifada. A state of emergency was declared in certain areas[6], and Israeli President Reuven Rivlin was constrained to warn of the danger of civil war[7]. Thirdly, as per United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) press releases of 17 and 19 May, rockets were fired on both days from South Lebanon across the Blue Line into Israel. Israeli artillery shelled the launch sites in retaliation. Also, Iranian complicity with Hamas was indicated when Israel downed an armed explosive drone, assessed to have been launched from either Syria or Iraq[8]. This raised the spectre of a wider conflict – the deepest fear of a nation-state surrounded by inimical neighbours, some of whom along with other non-state terrorist organisations refuse to recognize its right to exist.
Strategic and military aspects of this short conflict along with outcomes warrant analysis to provide a glimpse of the way ahead. Though President Biden announced that Israel had agreed to a mutual unconditional ceasefire, it is unclear what Hamas’s final stand on the matter was. More so, since it had set two conditions for a ceasefire: that Israeli forces stop incursions into the Al-Aqsa compound, and desist from evacuating Palestinian residents from East Jerusalem. No guarantees appear to have been received on these.
It appears, therefore, that since Hamas’s strategic aim of positioning itself as the champion of Palestinians through offensive action has been achieved, it could claim victory despite the high human, material and infrastructural cost. Israel has also claimed victory, by ensuring maintenance of the status quo along its borders and ensuring the security of its citizens at minimal cost, though with a perceptible fraying of its internal fabric. However prominent Israelis have criticized their government for lacking strategy and acting in ‘default mode’ in responding to Hamas in the same manner for the last 15 years[9].
Essentially, this was a conflict characterized by tremendous force asymmetry between opposing sides.
It is in the military domain that some interesting conclusions are drawn. This conflict did not witness any hand to hand fighting or launch of physical assaults, though Israel did use tanks and artillery against Hamas targets. Essentially, this was a conflict characterized by tremendous force asymmetry between opposing sides. The main weapon that Hamas used was unguided rockets of various ranges and dimensions. While in earlier days these were received from Iran or other allies across the Egyptian border at Sinai or smuggled in through sea, Hamas has developed sufficient expertise to develop its systems, using primitive technology and materials such as steel tubing and chemicals for making explosives. Israeli estimates suggested that ‘most of Hamas’s arsenal of 5,000 to 6,000 rockets can strike somewhere between the Gaza border communities and 40-55 km. away.’[10] Other estimates posit that Hamas now has rockets with ranges of 200 km or more, some with warheads carrying hundreds of kilograms of TNT and shrapnel. Raw construction material even uses detritus from Israeli missiles, with three rocket manufacturing factories rumoured to be existing inside Gaza[11]. Overall, Hamas fired around 4,360 rockets during the 11-day campaign, including a sizeable number that fell short, inside the Gaza Strip itself[12]. The long-range versions permitted engagement of targets from just outside the Strip to as far North as Jerusalem.
Hamas Qassam rocket ready for launch. Photo and description: Forbes May 12, 2021
Iron Dome carrying out intercepts – Image Credit: Businessinsider
The Israeli response on the other hand was a combination of air power and ground-based air defence with the firepower of tanks and artillery – all state-of-the-art weapon systems with latest generation cutting edge technology, including Israeli variant F 16s, F 15 Air Defence aircraft and F 35 Stealth fighters. Videos of Israeli strikes are testimony to their effectiveness. Israel too gave its campaign a symbolic name ‘Guardian of the Walls’. The Iron Dome Missile Defence System proved its worth with engineers continuously upgrading its algorithms to improve interception capability against larger rocket salvos. This has enabled Iron Dome to intercept one of the largest barrages fired ever – of around 130 rockets towards Tel Aviv on 11 May. Despite attempts to saturate the system, Iron Dome was able to neutralize the majority, permitting only a handful to get through[13]. However, limitations of Iron Dome are becoming apparent- Israeli security officials estimate that opponents like Hezbollah can fire over 1,000 rockets per day from a stockpile of over 150,000[14], which could overwhelm its capabilities. Also, Israeli IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) techniques were shown to be wanting, as the downing of a Skylark reconnaissance drone by Iron Dome friendly fire indicates[15]
Israeli soldiers fire a 155mm self-propelled howitzer towards the Gaza Strip from their position along the border with the Palestinian enclave on May 16, 2021. Photo: AFP/Jack Guez
asymmetric warfare thrives on a logic of its own, where the intelligent application of limited resources by the weak ensures some degree of military success
The above instance is a singular example of an asymmetry arising from one side’s lack of sophisticated warfighting equipment or access to technology being compensated for by sheer force of numbers, to defeat or stalemate superior enemy systems. Operations Research analysts have worked out a ratio of one Israeli dying for every 206 rockets reaching Israel in the first four days of fighting, with at least 134 rockets hitting populated areas[16]. Israeli military sources put the accuracy of these rockets at around 15 per cent. Though many fell in open areas, their deterrent effect was enough for Israelis to descend into their bomb shelters[17], thereby proving that even today, asymmetric warfare thrives on a logic of its own, where the intelligent application of limited resources by the weak ensures some degree of military success. This, despite a situation where most of the Artificial Intelligence, networked communication, quantum computing and precision standoff capability was on one side – though one could grant some level of technology available to Hamas, through its research laboratories in the Strip and inputs from Iran. Adding another dimension to such asymmetry in the larger context however is the history of injustice perpetrated on Palestinians over the years, providing strong psychological motivation in favour of any opponent of Israel.
Coming to the issue of outcomes, it is apparent that notwithstanding the asymmetry in capability, Hamas’s strategy has paid off. Having realized that the situation during Ramadan (created by Israel mostly through application of a purely law and order cum security template) was tailor-made for exploitation, it made Jerusalem the focus of its campaign, escaping in one go from the confines of Gaza.
With Palestinians rallying to its cause, resultant unrest in Israel and the West Bank and some support from Hezbollah in Lebanon, it was able to create a narrative in its favour. Notwithstanding its designation as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, UK and many other nations, it has garnered huge political capital, enabling it to rival the current Palestinian leadership as reports of Palestinians carrying green Hamas flags in cities on the West Bank, where the PNA traditionally holds sway, indicate[18]. The stark difference in respective casualty figures also helped, once again raising the issue of ‘proportionate vis a vis disproportionate response’, against the backdrop of repeated injustice to Palestinians over the last 70 years.
The IDF on the other hand worked efficiently with their usual precision, taking out as many targets as possible from their prepared lists, including networks of tunnels, headquarters, senior Hamas commanders and research infrastructure in the minimum amount of time. Without a doubt, Israel is a clear winner in military terms.
This conclusion however begs the larger question of whether military victory alone can decide winners and losers in world geopolitics. At the time of writing US Secretary of State, Blinken is on a four-day visit to the region, to interact with leaders of Israel, the PNA, Jordan and Egypt to strengthen foundations for a durable ceasefire. President Biden has signalled that West Asia is back on his agenda: in a hugely symbolic gesture, the US has announced its decision to reopen its Consulate in East Jerusalem and promised $32 million worth of aid to the UN in Gaza. White House spokesperson Jen Psaki has called this part of America’s efforts to rebuild ties with the Palestinians.
Whether this effort will be to purely manage a crisis or look for a permanent solution is unclear. The latter venture will require creative thinking by Israel, Palestinians and their neighbours and a shift from absolute positions which have shackled the region for over 70 years. In that eventuality, a fresh look at the Two-State Solution guaranteeing the right of both nations to exist as sovereign states might yet provide the alternative. Reverting to the status quo of April 2021 will not.
Notes:
[1] ‘Daily Chart. The Israel-Palestine conflict has claimed 14,000 lives since 1987’ The Economist 18 May 2021
[2] ‘Israel-Hamas truce begins after 11 days of fighting, Palestinians celebrate’ Reuters 21 May 2021
[3] Ibid.
[4] ‘After Years of Quiet, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Exploded. Why Now? ‘ Patrick Kingsley, The New York Times 15 May 2021
[5] ‘The Israel-Palestine Crisis: Causes, Consequences, Portents’ International Crisis Group 14 May 2021
[6] International Crisis Group 14 May 2021
[7] ‘Israeli president warns of civil war as Jews, Arabs clash over Gaza’ Rami Ayyub Reuters 13 May 2021
[8] ‘Netanyahu: Drone shot down earlier this week was Iranian UAV armed with explosives’ Judah Ari Gross The Times of Israel 20 May 2021
[9] Maj Gen Giora Eiland Retired, former head of Israel’s National Security Council in comments to Crisis Group 14 May 2021
[10] ‘What do Hamas and PIJ have in their rocket arsenals? – analysis’ Yonah Jeremy Bob The Jerusalem Post 11 May 2021
[11] ‘Israel’s Gaza challenge: stopping metal tubes turning into rockets’ Arshad Mohammed, Jonathan Saul, John Irish and Parisa Hafezi, Reuters 24 May 2021.
[12] Ibid.
[13] ‘How Israel and Hamas returned to armed conflict’ The Economist 22 May 2021
[14] ‘Is Iron Dome effective against Hamas rockets as originally thought?’ Yonah Jeremy Bob The Jerusalem Post 14 May 2021.
[15] ‘Iron Dome Shot Down an Israeli Drone During Israel-Gaza Fighting’ Yaniv Kubovich Haaretz 25 May 2021.
[16] ‘Gaza’s rocket technology challenges Israeli defenses’ Michael J Armstrong Asia Times 18 May 2021
[17] ‘Israel’s Gaza challenge: stopping metal tubes turning into rockets’ Reuters 24 May 2021.
[18] ‘Israel and Hamas Begin Cease-Fire in Gaza Conflict’ Iyad Abuheweila and Adam Rasgon The New York Times 21 May 2021
Image Credit: Wikipedia
